# First Off

#### First off is topicality-

#### A. Interpretation- Toward is in the direction of

**Merriam-Webster, 13** (‘toward’ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/toward>)

2to·ward preposition \ˈtō-ərd(z), ˈtȯ(-ə)rd(z), tə-ˈwȯrd(z), ˈtwȯrd(z), ˈtwōrd(z)\

Definition of TOWARD

1

: in the direction of <driving toward town>

2

a : along a course leading to <a long stride toward disarmament>

b : in relation to <an attitude toward life>

3

a : at a point in the direction of : near <a cottage somewhere up toward the lake>

b : in such a position as to be in the direction of <your back was toward me>

4

: not long before <toward the end of the afternoon>

5

a : in the way of help or assistance in <did all he could toward raising campaign funds>

b : for the partial payment of <proceeds go toward the establishment of a scholarship>

**Their engagement has to deal exclusively with economics in Mexico**

**B. Violation- The aff cannot claim to build us infrastructure to support its engagement in Mexico**

#### Mexico is the United Mexican States

**CIA World Factbook, 13** (updated on 6/10/13, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html>)

Country name:

conventional long form: United Mexican States

conventional short form: Mexico

local long form: Estados Unidos Mexicanos

local short form: Mexico

**That’s a voting issue**

**A. Precision – in depth research allows for the most knowledge**

**B. Predictable Limits – gives a stable case list because there are a limited number of conditions the countries will agree to – key to fairness and education**

# Next off

**Counterplan Text: The Government of the Russian Federation should substantially increase its economic engagement toward the government of Mexico in the area of renewable energy.**

#### Russia should engage Latin America – it’s politically preferred and the US is unpopular

Fillingham, 10 – (Zachary, BA in International Relations from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from the University of London, recipient of a Taiwan Ministry of Education Huayu Scholarship; “Russia Eyes Latin America,” Geopolitical Monitor, 5 April 2010, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russia-eyes-latin-america-3652)//HO

Russia is poised to occupy the diplomatic space created in Latin America by American decline. Broadly speaking, there are two factors that are currently harming American interests in Latin America. The first is the burden of history insofar that several governments view relations with the United States through the lens of Washington’s pseudo-colonial past. The second is American decline, or in other words, a new reality in global politics that casts the United States as one important player among several others. It follows that Latin American states now enjoy a greater degree of choice in international economic, political, and military engagements. In many ways, Russia is a natural winner here, for its’ capital, energy reserves, international influence, and military technology represent an appealing alternative to feeding the politically unpopular perception of American dominance in the region. Such was the dynamic at work during Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Venezuela. The visit resulted in the announcement of a $1 billion USD deal for a consortium of Russian energy companies to develop the Hunin-6 oil field; a reserve that could end up producing up to 450,000 barrels a day by 2017. Venezuela needs technology-intensive capital to develop its vast energy reserves and is politically averse to dealing with Washington. Consequently, Russia is able to step in as a natural partner. The same is true in the area of defense spending, as the Putin-Chavez summit also produced new military deals that could ultimately amount to anywhere from $2-$5 billion USD. Moscow has pledged to provide Venezuela with a variety of military hardware, including: T-72 tanks, Smerch rocket launchers, and other unspecified platforms. Bolivian President Evo Morales also benefited from Vladimir Putin’s Latin American visit to the tune of $100 million USD worth of loans to buy Russian helicopters. The political symbolism that underpins Russian re-engagement with Latin America cannot be understated. From the Rio Group’s announcement of the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELC)- a regional forum that excludes the United States- to Brazil’s more recent slapping of sanctions on a variety of American trade goods, there is no shortage of evidence to show that Latin American states are committed to moving out of the shadow of their powerful neighbor to the north. Given the trend of Latin American assertiveness of late, we may see another big announcement coming down during the BRIC countries summit in Brazil in mid-April. This issue carries symbolic weight on the Russian side as well. Re-engagement with Latin America offers Moscow an opportunity to reclaim some of the international prestige that vanished during the demise of the Soviet Union. To once again penetrate a region that carried so much weight during the Cold War caters to Russian nationalist sentiments, which just so happens to be a central pillar of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s political fortunes. That Putin did not cancel his scheduled trip to Venezuela after last week’s Moscow bombings is indicative of the importance that is currently being placed on engagement with Latin America. Given the mutual benefits, symbolic potency, and the diplomatic space afforded by American decline, we should expect Russia to continue to deepen relations with Latin American states, much to the displeasure of the Obama administration. Bolivian President Morales’ calls for Russia to “return to Latin America” will likely go down in history as prophetic, because that is exactly what’s going to happen.

# Next off

#### Mexico making moves to engage economically with China

Malkin 6/4/13 (Elisabeth, “Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building Trip to Mexico”, The New York Times, June 4 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0>)//CB

Latin American leaders have long complained that Washington pays too little attention to the rest of the hemisphere’s concerns, and China has begun to take advantage of that perception.

As Latin America and the Caribbean become less dependent on the United States, “they have another economic ally, and that economic ally is a superpower,” said S. Lynne Walker, the director of the China-Americas program at the Institute of the Americas in California.

Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, suggested that President Xi’s itinerary may also be intended as a message to the United States. “China wants to remind the U.S. that just as the U.S. has influence in regions close to China, China too has rising influence in the Americas,” he wrote in an e-mail.

Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward changing their frosty relationship.

Mexico’s government would like to narrow its large trade gap with China. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexico’s Ministry of Economy.

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is high and stabilizing – increased US engagement will trade-off with Chinese involvement

Watson 09 Professor of Strategy at National War College [Cynthia A. Watson, U.S. Responses to China’s Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]

CONCLUSIONS

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past fi ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reflects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China.

But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership.

The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefit for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me.

The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States.

At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.

#### Chinese lead in Latin American economies are vital to maintain their economic growth.

Arnson et al. ‘9(Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf>) (JN)

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military inﬂuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources that will help China maintain its economic growth. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.

#### Sustained economic growth prevents social unrest that would collapse the ruling party – that would cause great power war.

**Kane 01** [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

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The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefit for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me.

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# Next off

**US intervention in Mexico is a ruse to increase foreign domination of markets and create unequal economic ties.**

**Hart 02** – John and Rebecca Moores Distinguished Professor of History at U Houston, (John Mason, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War, 04/2002, eBook)//A-Berg

The American experience in Mexico offers a partial answer to the question of why the United States has so frequently supported oppressive tyrants with material aid, even while criticizing other governments for doing the same. Over1'iding material concerns, specifically the desire to extract wealth without opposition despite moral pronouncements, prompted financiers, railroad men, and ranchers to support military strongman Diaz against democratically elected Lerdo. Subsequently they backed Victo1'iano Huerta. Wilson supported Huerta with arms for over six months, hoping that the Mexican dictator could restore order; because he respected American property interests. Next the American financial elite briefly supported Francisco Villa but then shifted to Carranza as the lesser of two evils. Finally they lent their support to Alvaro Obregên Salido and Plutarcho Elias Calles. In every case the powerful Americans in the private sector had a far-reaching influence on official U.S. policy. During the 19905 those sectors of the American business community seeking relief from the demands of American labor supported President Bill Clinton and Treasury Secretary Robe1't E. Rubin in the approval of NAFTA. Meanwhile, they rushed to help Presidents Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon in their p1'ivatization efforts. The American elites' continuing interest in access to strategic resources in other parts of the world is an integral part of U.S. policymaking. The interests of elite American property holders and investors has been the most important factor in relations between the United States and other nations throughout the Western Hemisphere, outweighing objections to dictatorships in the countries in question even in the cases represented by "Papa Doc" Duvaliel; the Somoza patriarchs, and the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Uruguayan, and Central American generals of the 19705 and 19805. Although the CIA-supported overthrow of the democratic government of Guatemala in 19 54, the boycott of Nicaraguan products in 1980, and the ensuing support for the Contras were explained by the U.S. government in purely political terms, it is clear that a perceived nationalistic danger to the elaborate structure of American land ownership and trade hegemony in Central Ame1'ica was the deeper concern. Cooperative collaborating elites gained power as a result of U.S. intervention. In Africa, Ame1'ican support for the deployment of Belgian troops in Zaire by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization du1'ing the early 19605 provides another example of a misleading political emphasis given to strategies rooted in the effort to control strategic resources. Zaire contained one of the world's largest copper producing complexes, and American support for the creation of a client state run by a right-wing dictator instead of his nationalistic and left-wing counterpart ensured continued Western ownership of the copper mines. The violent, CIA-supported overthrow of the Sukarno government in oil-rich Indonesia underscores the mix of political and economic considerations behind American activism in the creation of client regimes. American corporate leaders and liberal and conservative U.S. administrations have worked with these antidemocratic regimes, including Nigeria in the mid 1990s, because they supported private enterprise and free trade, which were controlled by American elites. Middle-class Americans were also a strong cultural force in Mexico, and they remain so today. During the twentieth century their actions and attitudes reinforced the Mexicans' need to participate more fully in public affairs. Today American immigrants-retirees, spouses, scholars, students, and workers-continue to bring the American dream to Mexico. Their complexity of interests and activities sometimes creates an impression of fractionalization. Yet if we remember that most applied themselves to an occupation in order to survive, then we will understand why the main thrust of day-to-day middle-class American activity in Mexico has been in the workplace and in home life. This vision of individualism, competition, efficiency, religious practice, free markets, social mobility and democracy was and continues to be passed to Mexico's people with an intensity possible only between neighbors. As Americans have immigrated to Mexico on a massive scale, Hollywood movies, television shows, fast-food joints, baseball, blues, disco, jazz, and folk and rap music have permeated Mexican culture. The American dream represents a unique mix in which Western ideas about progress and individualism combine with a preoccupation with individual perfectibility and a belief that consumerism represents the ultimate path to human happiness. These American values and ideals transcend even the attraction of electoral democracy and political liberty. At its deepest level the American dream teaches that individuals are perfectible when emphasis is placed on education, personal and public hygiene, and physical fitness. The search for individual happiness has an even more common course. It is achieved through the materialism that developed alongside the growth of American businesses, first in Mexico during the late nineteenth century and now in the rest of the Third World. Happiness through consumerism is achieved by competition, efficiency and productivity. In daily life the people of Mexico and the Third World learn these lessons via advertising, television programs, and Hollywood movies that promise fulfillment through the acquisition of elegant clothing and sporty cars. The new individualism has replaced the community and family economic and cultural commitments once found in the traditional villages of the countryside.A major cultural component of the change has been the rise of Protestantism. The American Protestant sects that grew in Mexico during the nineteenth century are now flourishing in Brazil and Guatemala and spreading to the rest of Latin America. It relieves individuals of the responsibility to donate their savings to community welfare through fiesta rituals, and it offers them the right to communicate directly with God, removing the village priests from their mediating role between the deity and the people.2 America is an imperial force in Mexico because U.S. government authorities and privileged American citizens assert their power there in search of advantages. Beyond their personal resources, they use the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and multinational banks and corporations as instruments of that power. With their demands for reducing investment in social programs that would benefit Mexico's citizens and awarding budget priorities to debt payments for foreign creditors, the leaders of these institutions emphasize the goal of development. This ideology distinguishes them from middle-class Americans who hold more democratic beliefs. The elites who participate in these institutions are distinct from their counterparts during the age of European colonialism, when the rich and powerful sought the direct exploitation of openly enslaved peoples. The attempts to link the economies and peoples of Mexico and the United States have always been problematic and sometimes disastrous, but they have also been mutually beneficial. The benefits, howeven are lopsided, since the continuing relationship indicates roles for Mexican labor in American inclustrialism and American capital in the Mexican marketplace. Probable benefits include an increased per capita output for Mexico, which could potentially relieve the Mexican government of its onerous national debt by creating a larger economic base and providing a substantial marketplace for both A1ne1'icans and Mexicans. The challenge of and problem with NAFTA, however, lie in the idea of economic growth induced and effectively controlled by capitalists from out-side Mexico rather than from within. Under the coordinated plan of trade and investments represented by ADRs and NAFTA, the Mexican leaders are attempting to bypass the gradual, centuries-long, internalized process of commercial and then industrial growth that acculturated the peoples of Western Europe, the United States, and Iapan. Mexican prosperity, like that of the Four Tigers of Asia, depends upon outside investments and buyers and oscillates accordingly. In Mexico's case the outsiders are Americans. Unlike the Four Tigers, Mexico is a geographically large and socially diverse nation. It has the world's thirteenth largest economy and a population of approximately 1oo,ooo,ooo, half of whom live in what the government admits is extreme poverty. The rural population-30 percent of Mexico's citizens-lacks educational opportunities and will not be able to participate in an economic expansion in either the short or the mid term, except as menial laborers.

#### Economic development perpetuates the commodification of the environment and North-South divide making violence inevitable

**Howard, Hume, and Oslender 07** (\*David Howard – PhD in Latin America Studies from the University of Oxford; he is a lecturer in Sustainable Urban Development at the University of Oxford, \*\*Mo Hume – PhD in Latin American studies from the University of Liverpool; she is a professor of Development and Latin American Politics (Department of Politics) at the University of Glasgow, and \*\*\*Ulrich Oslender – PhD in Hispanic Studies from the University of Glasgow; former research fellow at the University of Glasgow in the Department of Geography, November 2007, “Violence, fear, and development in Latin America: a critical overview”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25548278.pdf) //MD

Others, however, have criticised 'Mrs Brundtland's disenchanted cosmos' and the fact that sustainable development is still based on the capitalisation of nature, expressed through global views on nature and environment by those who rule, instead of through local respect for surrounding landscapes (Visvanathan 1991). And Sachs (1992) argues in his widely read Development Dictionary that notions of ecology are merely reduced to higher efficiency, while a development framework is still accepted as the norm. Visvanathan (1991: 384) calls for an 'explosion of imaginations' as a form of resistance to this dominant economism and essentially violent development framework: a call echoed by Peet and Watts (1996: 263-8) in their edited collection on 'liberation ecologies', which envisages 'environmental imaginaries' as primary sites of contestation, which are then articulated by social movements that contest normative visions and the 'imperialism of the imaginary'. In many ways, the very notion of development has been radically called into question, as the concept has been linked to neo-colonial intentions of the Global North to intervene in and keep control of the countries in the Global South. For Escobar (1995: 159), dominant development discourse portrays the so-called 'third world' as a space devoid of knowledge, a 'chronic pathological condition', so that the Western scientist ‘like a good doctor, has the moral obligation to intervene in order to cure the diseased (social) body'. This intervention is always a violent one: one that ruptures the cultural fabric, penetrates the colonised body, and inserts a homogeneous developmental reasoning, often extirpating resistant cultural difference. To break this cycle of violent developmentalism, Escobar (1995) calls for an era of 'post-development' as a necessary step for national projects of decolonisation and for the affirmation of truly emancipatory political projects of self-affirmation.

**Critique comes first – colonialism is the root cause of modern violence**

**Quijano 2000** (Anibal Quijano – Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, 2000, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America”, http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf) //MD

The central question that interests us here is the following: **What is really new with respect to modernity?** And by this I mean not only what develops and redeﬁnes experiences, tendencies, and processes of other worlds, but, also, what was produced in the present model of global power’s own history. Enrique Dussel (1995) has proposed the category “transmodernity” as an alternative to the Eurocentric pretension that Europe is the original producer of modernity. According to this proposal, the constitution of the individual differentiated ego is what began with American colonization and is the mark of modernity, but it has a place not only in Europe but also in the entire world that American settlement conﬁgured. Dussel hits the mark in refusing one of the favorite myths of Eurocentrism. But it is not certain that the individual, differentiated ego is a phenomenon belonging exclusively to the period initiated with America. There is, of course, an umbilical relation between the historical processes that were generated and that began with America and the changes in subjectivity or, better said, the intersubjectivity of all the peoples that were integrated into the new model of global power. And those changes brought the constitution of a new intersubjectivity, not only individually, but collectively as well. This is, therefore, a new phenomenon that entered in history with America and in that sense is part of modernity. But whatever they might have been, those changes were not constituted from the individual (nor from the collective) subjectivity of a preexisting world. Or, to use an old image, those changes are born not like Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus, but are rather the subjective or intersubjective expression of what the peoples of the world are doing at that moment change and that they affect not only Europe but the entire globe. This is not a change in a known world that merely altered some of its traits. It is a change in the world as such. This is, without doubt, the founding element of the new subjectivity: the perception of historical change. It is this element that unleashed the process of the constitution of a new perspective about time and about history. The perception of change brings about a new idea of the future, since it is the only territory of time where the changes can occur. The future is an open temporal territory. Time can be new, and so not merely the extension of the past. And in this way history can be perceived now not only as something that happens, something natural or produced by divine decisions or mysteries as destiny, but also as something that can be produced by the action of people, by their calculations, their intention, their decisions, and therefore as something that can be designed, and consequently, can have meaning (Quijano 1988a).

**The alt is to decolonize the 1AC --- reject US intervention in Latin America to interrupt the imperial underpinnings of the 1AC**

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The aim of this paper is to think differently about International Relations (IR) by thinking differently about the Americas. I write this piece as a Latin Americanist, and as such, I bring a particular geographical and disciplinary perspective to the question of power in the region, drawing on the ‘‘coloniality of power’’ perspective developed by Latin American academics. This perspective has an explicit political agenda which seeks to ‘‘place knowledge at the service of decolonization’’ as the Venezuelan anthropologist Fernando Coronı ´l suggested (2005: 148). In this way, I join a struggle against gross inequalities of power, wealth, justice, and knowledge regimes on the global (and the local) stage by reflecting on IR from an intellectual place to the south and at the periphery of conventional thinking. More explicitly, I draw together insights from critical IR and coloniality theorizing in order to consider how thinking about the USA from Latin America might not only open decolonial perspectives on the country but also suggest decolonial strategies for IR. My aim is not to criticize US intervention in Latin America––many have spoken eloquently against its government’s imperialistic foreign policies––but to propose a different, perhaps complementary, strategy which aims to disturb US global hegemony from the inside out by questioning the idea of ‘‘America’’ as a unified, unproblematic, and settled settler society. It is precisely because the USA and the worldview that it promotes are central to IR that this contributes to a decolonial IR. Two important caveats are in order before I begin. Firstly, this article focuses particularly on indigenous experiences and it does not explore the equally important dynamics of injustice, racism, and inequality that emerge from the African-American experience. There are two key reasons for this. Most obviously, it would be impossible for me to do justice to both experiences in the confines of one journal article; I find myself already generalizing about indigenous societies which are extraordinarily varied. In addition, coloniality⁄modernity theorists focus particularly on indigenous struggles and philosophies, making this the more obvious topic for discussion. For these reasons, I have decided to focus on Native American dynamics in the coloniality of power. Secondly, as a white European, I can make no claim to write from a colonized position myself. However, as a Latin Americanist, I hope to contribute insights which are anchored in intellectual activity outside the IR core––both academically and geographically––and in particular to reflect on the decolonial possibilities that Latin America presents for IR, given its relationship to the United States. Decolonial Strategies and Insights from IR What might it mean to decolonize IR? One of the most important things that we can do, according to decolonial IR scholar Branwen Gruffydd Jones, is to question the deep political, ontological, and historical foundations of the discipline, asking how it came to be configured as it is and what sort of politics and social world it produces as a consequence (2006: 7–9). Many critical and postcolonial IR scholars have taken up this challenge, writing from and about different geopolitical and intellectual places. My purpose here is to join that conversation by drawing the ‘‘coloniality of power’’ scholarship into the discussion (along with, for example, Rojas (2007) who focuses on the question of development). This body of work is highly relevant not only because it dovetails with existing critical IR but also because it refers explicitly to experiences and power relations in the Americas. Thus, coloniality scholarship makes a double contribution because it opens a way to think differently about the USA, locating its critique at the heartland of international relationships and International Relations.

#### Renewables worsen the quality of life for the poor

Cecelski, 2k – (Elizabeth, worked for more than twenty-five years in problems of energy and developing countries, specializing in energy, poverty and gender issues, especially in household and rural energy; and in rural electrification and rural development; holds a BA from Duke University and an MA from John Hopkins.¶ As an energy economist at Resources for the Future, she co-authored Household Energy and the Third World Poor (1979) and Energy Strategies for Developing Nations (1981). She later worked for an appropriate technology NGO, VITA, and in the Rural Employment Policies Branch of the International Labour Organisation in Geneva. She is a founding member, and presently member of the Advisory Group and Technical Adviser for Advocacy & Research of ENERGIA, the International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy, and is the author of several standard references on gender and energy; “ENABLING EQUITABLE ACCESS TO RURAL ¶ ELECTRIFICATION: CURRENT THINKING AND MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN ENERGY, POVERTY AND GENDER,” 27 January 2000, http://www.sarpn.org/genderenergy/resources/cecelski/energypovertygender.pdf//HO

Sustainable energy development (SED) has been defined as sustainability in economic, ¶ social and environmental terms (deLucia, 1992; Munasinghe, 1995). Renewable energy ¶ and energy efficiency are usually characterized as "win-win" options in SED, meeting the ¶ objectives both of environmental improvement and poverty alleviation (with economics ¶ being the principal challenge). ¶ It is increasingly clear however that this is unlikely to be true in every case. The situation ¶ is considerably more complicated. Any technology when applied in a field situation ¶ represents gains and losses for different groups. More likely, there are "win-win" ¶ situations, "win-lose" situations, and "trade-offs" between environmental objectives and ¶ poverty reduction, to use a framework proposed by Munasinghe (1995)1¶ . ¶ A recent review of renewable energy activities in ESMAP (1999) points out that¶ The 'mainstreaming' of 'renewable energy' is not an end in itself, but is a means to ¶ satisfying two objectives namely the objective to reduce poverty and the objective to ¶ reduce global environmental damage that results from energy use. Under current ¶ incentive structures there will frequently be a trade off between these two objectives.¶ and concludes that although ¶ renewables may be the best choice in some circumstances, restricting support to ¶ renewable energy sources alone places severe additional burdens on poor people, ¶ and denies them the opportunity for productivity growth that fossil fuelled ¶ technologies facilitate.

#### Mexico will say no to decentralized energy production

Huacuz, 5 – (Jorge, Director of the Non-Conventional Energies Unit, Mexican Electric Research Institute; “The road to green power in Mexico—reflections on the prospects for the large-scale and sustainable implementation of renewable energy”, *Energy Policy*, Vol. 33, Issue 16, pages 2087–2099, November 2005, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421504001041)//HO

Technical, economic and institutional barriers had to be removed at the onset of the large-scale deployment of green power facilities in countries where new renewables are now becoming an important option (IEA, 1997). Individual countries have implemented strategies according to their particular circumstance, most of them embedded in their legal framework. For instance, in the United States, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) issued in 1978, was instrumental in the early implementation of a large variety of green power technologies. PURPA required utilities to purchase green power from small non-utility producers at avoided cost rates. In more recent times Spain introduced a special regime for renewables in which green power producers can get either a fixed price for the kWh fed to the grid, or a variable price calculated from the average price of the market pool plus a bonus per every kWh produced (Avia, 2000). In Germany an Electricity Feed Law was introduced in 1991, obligating utilities to buy green power from independent generators at preferential rates. This law was replaced in the year 2000 by the “Act on Granting Priority to Renewable Energy Sources” also known as the “Renewable Energy Sources Act”, which regulates the prioritization of grid-supplied electricity from renewable sources (FMENCNS, 2000). In India, a whole Ministry for Non-Conventional Energy Sources was created over a decade ago, while in China a law issued in 1999 allows renewable energy projects to receive loans at reduced rates and guarantees access to the grid and premium buy-back prices (Lew and Logan).¶ The large-scale introduction of renewables in Mexico will not be easy. A number of barriers of different kinds have to be removed for this to happen (Huacuz, 2001). As already mentioned, the current legal framework does not favour the adoption of new renewables by the EPS, and virtually excludes any possibility of adopting incentive mechanisms based on preferential feed-in tariffs. On the other hand, distributed generation may be perceived as risky within a centrally structured utility (due to possible loss of political control over the electricity business; negative impacts on the integrity, safety and quality of the grid, etc.), or the “bigger is better” paradigm, followed by many power engineers can inhibit needed decisions. From the planning point of view, availability of fossil fuels challenges the wisdom of developing local renewable energy sources.¶ International experience shows that success in creating a market for renewables is contingent upon private sector involvement. Based on this premise, a number of stakeholders in Mexico would like to see the hands of the government off the renewables business. However, experience also shows that government participation in the early stages of market development is critical in creating a favourable legal framework, providing adequate institutional support and setting long-term goals. It is unlikely that, due to budgetary constraints, the GOM will finance capital-intensive renewable energy projects, beyond early pilots or demonstrations. But experience in the commercial development of renewable power projects does not exist in Mexico, and hence, participation of the government is expected in many areas. For instance, a number of elements from the potential financial network useful for this purpose need to be identified and strengthened; regulatory barriers, which turn into financial constraints by perpetuating perceived high investment risks, associated with elevated project preparation costs and long lead times, need to be removed, along with subsidies now applied to conventional energy, which negatively impact the economic viability of renewable energy projects. No credits for capacity are currently granted for intermittent power production facilities, and CFE is under no obligation to purchase any renewable energy production, although in the case of self-supply with intermittent sources CFE is mandated to serve as an energy storage as explained earlier. Otherwise the regulatory framework is such that CFE cannot unilaterally grant exceptions or provide incentives for renewables, unless the legal framework is modified or alternative attractive market-based solutions are identified.

**No risk of resources wars – Studies are flawed and economic scarcity is overstated.**

**Deudney 99** – (Dan, Associate Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, Eds. Deudney & Matthews p 205-6)

The hypothesis that states will begin fighting each other as natural resources are depleted and degraded seems intuitively accurate. The popular metaphor of a lifeboat adrift at sea with declining supplies of clean water and rations suggests there will be fewer opportunities for positive-sum gains between actors as resource scarcity grows. Many fears of resource war are derived from the cataclysmic world wars of the first half of the twentieth century Influenced by geopolitical theories that emphasized the importance of land and resources for great power status, Adolf Hitler fashioned Nazi German war aims to achieve resource autonomy. The aggression of Japan was directly related to resource goals: lacking indigenous fuel and minerals, and faced with a slowly tightening embargo by the Western colonial pow ers in Asia, the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia for oil, tin, and rub ber. Although the United States had a richer resource endowment than the Axis powers, fears of shortages and industrial strangulation played a central role in the strategic thinking of American elites about world strategy. During the Cold War, the presence of natural resources in the Third World helped turn this vast area into an arena for East-West conflict. Given this record, the scenario of conflicts over resources playing a powerful role in shaping international order should be taken seriously. However, there are three strong reasons for concluding that the familiar scenarios of resource war are of diminishing plausibility for the foreseeable future. First, the robust character of the world trade system means that states no longer experience resource dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy. During the 1930s, the collapse of the world trading system drove states to pursue economic autarky, but the resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met without territorial control of the resource source. As Ronnie Lipschutz has argued, this means that re source constraints are much less likely to generate interstate violence than in the past. Second, the prospects for resource wars are diminished by the growing difficulty that states face in obtaining resources through territorial conquest. Although the invention of nuclear explosives has made it easy and cheap to annihilate humans and infrastructure in extensive areas, the spread of conventional weaponry and national consciousness has made it very costly for an invader, even one equipped with advanced technology, to subdue a resisting population, as France discovered in Indochina and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. At the lower levels of violence capability that matter most for conquering and subduing territory; the great powers have lost effective military superiority and are unlikely soon to regain it. Third, nonrenewable resources are, contrary to intuitive logic, becoming less economically scarce. There is strong evidence that the world is entering what H. E. Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg have labeled the “age of substitutability,” in which industrial technology is increasingly capable of fashioning ubiquitous and plentiful earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon, and hydrocarbons into virtually everything needed by modem societies. The most striking manifestation of this trend is that prices for virtually every raw material have been stagnant or falling for the last two decades despite the continued growth in world economic output. In contrast to the expectations widely held during the 1970s that resource scarcity would drive up commodity prices to the benefit of Third World raw material suppliers, prices have fallen.

#### Cooperation high – specifically in decentralized production

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(“Transcending the Rio Grande,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/mexico.pdf)//BB

Cooperation between the United States and Mexico in alternative energy is not new. For ¶ at least the past 10 to 15 years, various partnerships between the Mexican government, the ¶ U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. AID have been undertaken to develop renewable ¶ energy projects aimed at bringing electricity to Mexico’s rural and poor regions. These were focused on small photovoltaic solar energy projects as a means to spread electricity ¶ generation to dispersed, rural, and poor communities. The U.S.-Mexico partnerships have ¶ successfully delivered electricity to schools and distance-learning projects throughout ¶ rural Mexico and Central America, as well as water pumping systems in areas of the country that remain off the national power grid.